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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
ADVANCED MANAGEMENT
CONCEPTS, INC.
Appellant,
vs.

Case No:20040524-CA

STAFFING AMERICA, INC.
Appellee.
MOTION OF APPELLANT TO AMEND BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Pursi ant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Appellant respectfully moves the Court to permit Appellant to withdraw its Fourth
Argument ent tied

"The Trial Court Had No Jurisdictional Authority To Compel A

Third Party, P.edland Insurance Company To Place Funds In Escrow Pursuant To A
Garnishment \ction By Staffing" located on pages 33 through 38 of the brief.
Subsequent to filing its Brief, Appellant concluded that it did not desire to
pursue the arc uments set forth under the above Fourth Argument and therefore
respectfully noves this Court to grant leave for Appellant to withdraw its Fourth
Argument.

Appellee has responded to Appellant's Fourth Argument on pages 32
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through 36 of its brief and while Appellee's argument is well taken, Appellee does not
request an injunction, stay or other extraordinary proceeding with respect to the money
presented helc in the Court Ordered escrow.
Therefore, as there is no damage to either party by the withdrawal of
kppeWajvV s> F wxrth PtfgvR&xk, A^p^llasA tespectfuUyrequests,tiaaitiha.Oasrt. grasA
Appellant's Notion to Amend its Brief by Withdrawing the Fourth Argument.

Y?f of March, 20Q5
Dated thi^y-flay

,.., ..

y

,. / _

DONALDJOSEPH P|JRSER
Attorney for Appellant

~

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion of
Appellant to Amend Brief of Appellant, via United States Post Office, postage prepaid,
to:
Matthew C. Barneck
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
50 South Main
Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
on the _ i _ day ofjasrfelf,2005.
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Staffing America, a Delaware
corporation,

ORDER

Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 20040524-CA
Advanced Management Concepts,
Inc., a Nevada corporation;
Pacific Life & Annuity Company
(fka PM Group Life Insurance
Company and/or Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Company) a
California corporation,
Defendants and Appellants.

This matter is before the Court on Appellant's motion, filed
April 5, 2005, to amend its brief of Appellant.
Appellant seeks to withdraw its fourth argument entitled
"The Trial Court had no Jurisdictional Authority to Compel a
Third Party, Redland Insurance Company to Place Funds in Escrow
Pursuant to a Garnishment Action by Staff", located on pages 33
through 3 8 of the brief.
Now, therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the motion is
granted. The fourth argument of Appellant's brief is stricken.
Dated this j L

day of April, 2005.

FOR THE COURT:

Russell jy. Bench,
Associate Presiding Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on April 12, 2005, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to
the parties listed below:
MATTHEW C. BARNECK
BRIAN C WEBBER
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER & NELSON
50 S MAIN #700
PO BOX 2465
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84110-2465
DONALD J PURSER
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2595 E 3300 S
3RD FLOOR
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84109
Dated this April 12, 2005.

By
><^K/L4.4A^
Deputy Clerk
Case No. 20040524
District Court No. 980912587
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is granted to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 3 and
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES and STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ALLOWED APPELLEE TO
PRESENT EVIDENCE REGARDING SPECULATIVE FUTURE PROFITS and
IMPROPERLY GRANTED JUDGMENT FOR SPECULATIVE FUTURE
PROFITS
2. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED ATTORNEYS'
FEES AGAINST APPELLANT WHERE THERE IS NO CONTRACTUAL
PROVISION OR STATUTE ALLOWING THE GRANTING OF ATTORNEYS'
FEES.
3. THE EVIDENCE SHOWS APPELLEE SUFFERED
SUBSTANTIALLY LESS DAMAGES THAN ALLEGED AND THUS A
JUDGMENT FOR THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED CANNOT BE
IMPOSED UPON APPELLANT
4. TJIE TRIAL COURT HAD NO JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY
TO COMPEL A THIRD PARTY, REDLAND INSURANCE CO. TO PLACE
FUNDS IN ESCROW PURSUANT TO A GARNISHMENT ACTION BY
STAFFING

STANDARD OF REVIEW
"[W]e review the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness, granting

[them] no particular deference ...." ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247
(Utah 1997).
"On the other hand, we review the trial court's findings of fact for clear error,
reversing only where the finding is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if
we otherwise reach a firm conviction that a mistake has been made." ProMax, 943
P.2d at 255
For a mixed question of law and fact, which requires a trial court to
determine "whether a given set of facts comes within the reach of a given rule of
law," State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), "we [still] review legal questions
for correctness, [but] we may... grant a trial court discretion in its application of
the law to a given fact situation." Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998).
Calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound discretion of the trial
court, and will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse of
discretion." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988)
Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a question of law, which we review
for correctness. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998).

CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Appellant does not rely on any constitutional or statutory provisions for
5

relief from the decision of the trial court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter concerns the failure of Appellant to provide continuous
health insurance coverage to Appellee's employee leasing clients. While it is
undisputed that Appellant failed to pay for promised insurance coverage, the
dispute in this matter concerns, inter alia, the actual and speculative damages
suffered by Appellee and whether Appellee is entitled to an award of attorney fees
on an hourly basis which is much less than a case taken on a contingency fee.
The matter was tried to the trial court without a jury over two days. The
trial court awarded judgment in the amount of $451,844, prejudgment interest of
$269,016.77, attorneys' fees of $240,286.92 (based upon a one-third contingency
contract), litigation expenses of $39,161.53 and post judgment interest at the rate
of 3.28% per annum from the judgment date of 19 May, 2004.
Appellant Advanced Management Concepts, Inc. timely appealed the
judgment.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1. In 1996, Appellant, Advanced Management Concepts, Inc. (AMC)
6

started its business by providing employee benefits to employee leasing companies
sometimes known as professional employer organizations (plaintiffs exhibit 3,
S0000045).
2. In 1996, AMC and appellee, Staffing America, Inc., (Staffing)
entered into a business relationship and became co-employers of employees of
Staffing's clients for purposes of health insurance and workmen's compensation
coverage (trial record, 551, trial transcript, page 17, lines 18-21).
3. Under their arrangement, Staffing monthly informed AMC of the
name of each employee to receive health insurance coverage, (tr, 552).
4. Staffing passed through to AMC the monthly health insurance
premiums it received from its clients, Staffing took out its commissions or service
charges prior to sending the client's money to AMC and AMC then paid the group
health insurance premiums, (tt, p. 20, In. 5-12)
5. In November of 1996, the group health insurance coverage obtained
by AMC with the national health insurer known as Jefferson Pilot was cancelled
due to the alleged failure by AMC to pay the health insurance premiums.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 12, S0000001).
6. AMC then "self-insured" the clients' employees until it acquired
new insurance coverage with PM Group starting in July of 1997. (Findings of
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Fact, para. 30, 33, tr 555-556).
7. Staffing paid the monthly health insurance premiums received from
various clients (less their service fee) to AMC from July of 1997 through February
of 1998. (Findings of Fact, para 34, tr 556).
8. AMC paid all health insurance premium payments from July, 1997
through the middle of November, 1997, albeit the payments were late and were
accepted by PM Group after strong negotiations by an insurance broker. (Findings
of Fact, paragraphs 33, 37,42, tr 556, 557, 558
9. However, the late payment plan was unfulfilled and the insurance
coverage again was cancelled as of November 30,1997 (Findings of Fact, para 36,
42, tr 557, 558).
10. From 10 October, 1997 through 25 January, 1998, AMC did not
notify Staffing of:
a. its delinquency in premium payments;
b. notices of cancellation sent by PM Group;
c. an IRS levy freezing AMC's bank accounts;
d. negotiations with PM Group of negotiations to reinstate
coverage; and
e. the failure of AMC to make the reinstatement payments
8

timely and in full resulting in the final cancellation of the health insurance policies.
(Findings of Fact, 44, tr 559)
11. Subsequently, Staffing obtained its own health insurance coverage
for its employees effective 1 March, 1998. (Findings of Fact, para 46, tr 559).
12. Staffing paid out actual costs of $143,233.00 in medical claims
and other costs which should have been paid by the AMC health insurance benefits
programs. (Findings of Fact, para. 48, tr 559-560).
13. Staffing paid $79,612 of its clients' monies in payments to AMC
for health insurance premiums to employees, however, AMC did not use the
monies to pay for the health insurance premiums. (Findings of Fact, para 49, tr.
560)
14. Staffing claimed it lost "several" clients as a result of the
cancellation of the health insurance coverage through PM Group and the trial court
found, with reasonable certainty, that the amount of profit lost by Staffing was
$228,999. (Findings of Fact, para 50, tr. 560).
15. In contradiction of evidentiary standards, Dan Roberts, a witness
for Staffing, testified:
Well, it was-it was a devastation to the company, because we
immediately lost our clients and some of the clients were substantial
for our company. And when they went off our service, but not only
went off but they tried to take other people with them, so that the word
9

got out rapidly. And so over the next, you know, year, year and a half,
we tried to reconcile, we tried to find other companies to carry their
health insurance, we tried to-and we did with a few of them, but many
of them we lost, probably 20, 30 per cent of our income almost
immediately. So it was quite devastating.
But the-not only that, but the effect of future business with
people I had been working on, or with some of our sales-type people
that were referring business to us lost credibility. Staffing America
lost credibility in certain states, and it was difficult to recover. And in
most instances, we haven't recovered yet. So-but, immediately, we
saw a tremendous effect on our income, (tt, p. 78,112-19)
15. The total principal damages claimed as lost by Staffing was
$451,844 (Findings of Fact, para 52, tr. 560).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Future lost profits were not proved by Staffing as its own exhibits
testify of increased income in years subsequent to the alleged actions of AMC and
highly variable costs not consistent with projections of stable income and
expenses.
Attorneys' fees are not permitted in this matter as there was never a
fiduciary relationship established between AMC and Staffing, but rather, Staffing
was a mere conduit for employee funds which were passed on to AMC for
payment of health insurance premiums. When AMC failed to timely make certain
of the payments, AMC paid costs incurred by the employees and thus affirmed the
fiduciary relationship which it had established with the employees. That same
10

fiduciary relationship never existed between Staffing and AMC and therefore it
was in error for the trial court to find that Staffing was entitled to over $270,000 of
attorney fees based upon a breach of a fiduciary relationship between AMC and
Staffing.

ARGUMENT
1. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ALLOWED APPELLEE TO
PRESENT EVIDENCE REGARDING SPECULATIVE FUTURE PROFITS and
IMPROPERLY GRANTED JUDGMENT FOR SPECULATIVE FUTURE
PROFITS
Case law in Utah is clear that lost profits cannot be awarded when such profits
are speculative and are not soundly based upon evidentiary fact. While Staffing
testified at trial that it had lost business, its numbers and figures for such lost
business could not be articulated and were speculative and turbid at best. Staffing
testified that "several" clients were lost as a result of the failure of health insurance
by AMC and that "a number" of clients dropped business dealings because of the
insurance problems. Business dropped off by "20% to 30%" and AMC did not
acquire new business at the same rate which it had prior to the insurance
difficulties with AMC.
While at first blush Staffing seems to present a case for lost profits, a close
examination of the applicable case law illustrates that Staffing has failed to carry
the burden of proof to be entitled to receive an award for lost profits.
li

Below,

AMC discusses those cases which are pertinent to the question of damages
awarded for lost profits.
1. Winsness v. M.J. Conoco Distributors, Inc.593 P.2d 1303 (1979).
Winsness leased land to Conoco in which Conoco agreed to operate a gas station
24 hours per day with the lease payment based on a percentage of the gasoline
sales. Winsness presented proof at trial that the station was not open for 24 hours
per day and was frequently closed.
Because the lease payment was a percentage of sales, Conoco argued that it
was making full lease payments and that there were no grounds to terminate the
lease. Winsness disagreed, claiming it was suffering substantial damages from the
failure of Conoco to provide around the clock service at the gas station. The Utah
Supreme Court ruled
'The crucial issue as to the first claim for relief is whether Lessor adduced
evidence from which a jury could have reached a conclusion as to the
amount of Lessor's money damages based on something more substantial
than speculation." Id. at 1305.
"The subject of certainty of proof as to damages has frequently concerned
this Court and most others. While subscribing to the doctrine that a verdict
based on "mere speculation" cannot be upheld, we have consistently
recognized that some degree of uncertainty is inevitable in damage
determinations of the type involved in this suit.
"Professor Corbin states the controlling principles which are consistent with
the Utah cases:
There is little that can be regarded as "certain, " especially with
12

respect to what would have happened if the march of events had been
other than it in fact has been. Neither court nor jury is required to
attain "certainty" in awarding damages; and this is just as true with
respect to "value" as with respect to "Profits." Therefore, the term
"speculative and uncertain profits" is not really a classification of
profits, but is instead a characterization of the evidence that is
introduced to prove that they would have been made if the defendant
had not committed a breach of contract. The law requires that this
evidence shall not be so meager or uncertain as to afford no
reasonable basis for inference, leaving the damages to be determined
by sympathy and feelings alone. The amount of evidence required and
the degree of its strength as a basis of inference varies with
circumstances. A greater amount and a higher degree are required in
those cases in which it is usually possible to produce it than in cases
where it is usually impossible or difficult and the defendant has reason
to know i t . . . . " Corbin on Contracts, vol. 5, section 1022 (emphasis
added). Winsness, supra at 1306.
The principal adduced is that the evidence supporting damages for lost
profits must be substantial with no reference to feelings of sympathy for the injured
party. This is good reasoning, and applied to the case at hand, while the third
party observer would certainly be sympathetic to the plight of Staffing, that same
third party observer cannot adduce sufficient evidence from any witness produced
by Staffing, to determine, with any reasonable degree of certainty, the amount of
any damages which had been and which would be suffered by Staffing as a result
of the negligent actions by AMC.
2. Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985).
Mountain Bell listed same telephone number for two St. George law firms. Mt.
Bell eventually changed the number of one firm and placed an intercept on the
13

number. Atkins sued the telephone company for lost profits and the jury awarded
damages to Atkins, determining that the telephone number error caused Atkins
substantial damages. The Supreme Court overruled.
"To prove damages, the plaintiff must prove two points. First, it must
prove the fact of damages. The evidence must do more than merely
give rise to speculation that damages in fact occurred; it must give rise
to a reasonable probability that the plaintiff suffered damages as a
result of the breach. Second, the plaintiff must prove the amount of
damages. The level of persuasiveness required to establish the fact of
loss is generally higher than that required to establish the amount of a
loss." Mat336.
"While the standard for determining the amount of damages is not so
exacting as the standard for proving the fact of damages, there still
must be evidence that rises above speculation and provides a
reasonable, even though not necessarily precise, estimate of
damages." Id.
The amount of damages may be based upon approximations, if the
fact of damages is established, and the approximations are based upon
reasonable assumptions or projections." Id.
"In this case, Atkin offered no proof whatsoever of lost net income.
Proof of loss of gross income only is an insufficient foundation for
proof of amount of damages." Id.
While Staffing attempted to introduce evidence, albeit speculative, regarding
damages for lost income, the question begs: Was it for lost profits or lost income?
A distinction with a difference which is not answered by Staffing.
Although determination of damages may be based on approximations, those
approximations must be based upon reasonable assumptions. In order for an
14

assumption to be reasonable, there must be some foundation laid by the testifying
witness of the nature and scope of the damages and the calculations used to arrive
at such damage calculation.
In the instant case, the foundation laid for determining damages is a mere
extrapolation based on guesses of how growth would expand Staffing's future
business. There is no reference to industry norms, to the rate of growth of the
economy, to the negative influence of competitors driving down profit margins or
to any other variables necessarily needed to develop a true and accurate projection
of the growth of Staffing. As already quoted above,
The amount of damages may be based upon approximations, if
the fact of damages is established, and the approximations are based
upon reasonable assumptions or projections." Atkin Wright & Miles v.
Mountain States Tel 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985)

3. Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co. 722 R2d 773 (Utah 1986) Sawyers sold
end-dump coal trailers and had a line of credit from FMA to supply interim
financing for the trailers. Shortly after starting business, FMA cancelled the line of
credit causing Sawyers to lose their distributorship. Trial court found that FMA
wrongfully canceled line of credit but that damages to Sawyers were too
speculative and the evidence was insufficient to enable the court to determine the
amount of damages. The only issue on appeal was whether court erred in denying

15

damages for loss of future profits.
"The fact of damages must be proved with reasonable certainty and
the amount by a reasonable though not necessarily precise estimate,
citing Atkin" Id at 777.
"A party is entitled to recover only lost net profits, [emphasis added]
[cites] Net profits are determined by computing the difference
between the gross profits and the expenses that would be incurred in
acquiring such profits, [cite] Therefore, proof of lost gross profits
does not afford courts a proper basis for a damage award, where there
is no evidentiary basis on which to calculate net profits with
reasonable certainty, [cites] Id.
"Reasonable certainty requires more than a mere estimate of net
profits. In addition to proof of gross profits, there must generally be
supporting evidence of overhead expenses or other costs of producing
income from which a net figure can be derived, [cites] Plaintiff, of
course, has the burden to produce a sufficient evidentiary basis to
establish the fact of damages and to permit the trier of fact to
determine with reasonable certainty the amount of lost net profits,
[cites].
"Plaintiffs here presented evidence on gross profit losses only. Their
failure to place before the court financial summaries, monthly sales
volume breakdowns, costs of sales expenses, or any other overhead
expenses from which the trial court could reasonably have calculated
plaintiffs lost net profit is fatal to their claim." Id. at 775.
The testifying expert must calculate not only the lost income, but also the
expenses which had to be incurred to produce the lost income, including, financial
summaries, monthly sales volume breakdowns, costs of sales expenses and
evidence of overhead costs. Without such information, the court cannot
reasonably determine the amount of profits lost, and the claim should fail to pass
16

evidentiary muster in the court below.
As applied to the case at bar, Staffing's expert witness, Paul Shields,
testified that he prepared Exhibit 55 which contains part 4, entitled Comparative
Income Statements and Calculation of Avoided Costs. While there is no
testimony elicited from the witness regarding the means and method he used to
project the sales for future years, there is also no testimony given by him
explaining the unusual calculations of avoided costs.
Avoided costs are those overhead costs not incurred when sales are lost. As
stated by Mr. Shields:
So while they [Staffing] may have lost, you know, just to throw out a
number, $1,000 worth of revenue, they don't have to make trips to
Georgia, their telephone expenses may go down, they may have fewer
office supplies and other costs because those sales were reduced. (TR,
pg 313, In 5-9)
In examining Exhibit 55, part 4, we look at the avoided costs calculated by
Mr. Shields to determine if such calculations are reasonable. If his calculations of
avoided costs are reasonable, then his calculations of projected income and profits
are very likely reasonable.
Staffing shows income for the years 1997 through 2002 as follows:

1997

1998

1999

2000

17

2001

2002

1,699,011

1,273,384 4,554,627

3,523,622

2,734,494

3,037,008

As a percentage of the prior year's income, years 1998 through 2002 are:
.749

3.576

.773

.776

1.110

The trend in the receipt of income shows not a decline after the allegedly nefarious
acts of AMC in 1996 and 1997, but an increase! While the difference between the
1997 and 1998 income declines by 25.1 percent, the increase in the following year
of 1999 is 357%! And the income for 2000 is still more than double the income
for 1997, the year after the negligent acts of AMC. This is an amazing increase of
income for a company allegedly damaged and ruined by the failure of AMC to pay
health insurance premiums.
4. Canyon Country Store v. Bracey 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989). The
plaintiff's truck was in accident and the insurer refused to pay, stating the tires on
the truck were bad and there was no liability. The jury awarded damages for lost
profits, which the insurer appealed. Addressing the trial court's determination of
lost profits, the Utah Supreme Court opined:
"Finally, the amount awarded for lost profits was speculative. No
contracts had ever been entered into by Canyon Country, and the only
evidence of an amount lost was given by Frank Stuart, a financial
consultant.... No other proof regarding the existence and number of
these hypothetical customers was offered. And, the amount of lost
profits was not shown with sufficient certainty to allow recovery." Id.
at 419.
18

"Although there is not enough evidence in the record to support (lit
trucking business lost profits award, we affirm the lost profits
awarded from Canyon Country's grocery business. Evidence,
although conflicting with that of the insurers, was presented at trial
sufficient to prove the fact of lost profits, their causation, and the
amount. Canyon Country's expert witness Stuart testified about a net
profit forecast based upon voluminous sources, including the store's
books and records and evidence of actual profits of similar businesses.
Although Canyon Country never made a profit during its short
lifespan, the jury apparently believed that, had the insurers paid the
claim promptly, Canyon Country would have been able to continue
and conduct business profitably." Id. at 419

The key to the anal)/ sis is that tl le expert, witness provided evidence of
actual profits of similar businesses. The Canyon Count -•

;

-M v*e

and trouble to evaluate the actions and activities of similar uubincisis so ih.:

?

of fact could reasonably determine whether the plaintiff's expert witness was
creating numbers out of air, (unsupported speculation) or was using projections
based upon the experience of similar businesses. Because the Canyon Country
plaintiffs took the time and effort to research and present the activities of similar
businesses to Ihe com! iitc I Ihih Supiviiu' < "inn I upheld the award of damages.
Unfortunately for Staffing Amen* .1, then expert did m»i Like tin- tune to
undertake such an exercise, instead only using numbers, projections and hopelul
expectations of the management of Staffing. In part 7 of Exhibit 55, Staffing's
expert witness projects that two accounts which would have been acquired but for

19

the actions of AMC were not acquired in each of the years 1999 through 2002.
Interestingly, for 1998, the monthly lost profits for the accounts which would have
been acquired (presumably) are established at an average of $4,920 per account
while the average of the monthly profits for the existing accounts is $3712. The
expert does not justify why he pegs awarding twenty-five percent more profits to
speculative, future and unknown acquired accounts than he does to the existing
accounts.
Staffing's expert witness is not basing his projections of profit loss on
comparative businesses, but on numbers extrapolated from an unknown, and
therefore, unacceptable source.
The Utah appellate courts have established a clear standard for proving
damages for future profits and Staffing has failed to meet that standard. Therefore,
that portion of the judgment pertaining to future profits should be exorcised and the
judgment should be reduced accordingly.
2. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED ATTORNEYS' FEES
AGAINST APPELLANT WHERE THERE IS NO CONTRACTUAL
PROVISION OR STATUTE GRANTING ATTORNEYS' FEES.

a. There is no provision for an award of attorney fees.
It is established law in Utah that "Attorney fees are generally recoverable in
Utah only when authorized by statute or contract." Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins.
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Co., 2002 UT 68, <|[52, 56 P J d 524 11K J . JU02). ..
When attorney fees are granted by the court, a very careful analysis ui me
attorneys'fees is undertaken:
In exercising its discretion to determine reasonable attorney fees for
purposes of an attorney fee award, the trial court should find answers to four
questions:
1. What legal wmi was »n liKtliy (HiloniiaP
2. How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to adequately
prosecute the matter?
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates customarily charged
in the locality for similar services?
4. Are thpre circumstances which require consideration of additional factors,
including those listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility? Dixie State
Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988)
By claiming that it is entitled to attorney fees based not on the actual legal
work undertaker), the fuue it) prosecute the matter, whether the billing rate is
customary or wheth* ; :3 ^re are additioi lal factors, bi it i athei c >i 1 1 i coi itii lgei icy basis
of one-third of the amount collected, Staffing eviscerates the ei itire bod) ' of legal
analysis carefully crafted by the Utah courts over the years to evaluate and
carefully weigh a fair and reasonable amount of attorney fees to be awarded to a
successful litigant entitled to attorney fees.
b. There is no fiduciary relationship proven and no basis for attorney fees
for breach of a fiduciary relationship.
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Staffing argues to the trial court that it does not have to meet the standards
established by Dixie State, supra and its progeny because it fits under a unique
category in the field of breach of fiduciary duty. Why a breach of a fiduciary duty
entitles a successful litigant to receive a blanket one-third of contingency
collection, without any determination of the hours expended, the hourly rate
charged or the reasonableness of either is not explored by Staffing, but rather,
Staffing merely obliquely refers to the right granted to the victim of a bad faith
insurance defense claim to justify a $240,286.92 award of attorney fees in this
matter.
Staffing relies on Campbell v. State Farm Insurance, 65 P.3d 1134, 2001 UT
89, which finds that State Farm Insurance breached a fiduciary duty to its insured
when it refused to defend and protect Campbell who was involved in an
automobile accident. While Campbell certainly is good law for bad faith insurance
automobile liability cases, the analogy between Campbell and the case at bar takes
a fair stretch to justify the results obtained. The insured in Campbell had a written,
paid for and defined contract with State Farm requiring State Farm to defend and
protect him from the economic effects of an automobile accident. State Farm
refused to extend such protection, breached its fiduciary duty to Campbell and was
therefore subject to compensatory damages suffered by Campbell and substantial
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punitive damages awarded by the j ury.
The analogy does not carry over to the instant case. First, AMC was not a
fiduciary for Staffing, but rather, AMC is the fiduciary for each insured. Staffing
was but a condiiit for the receipt of the monthly insurance payments withheld from
the insured's periodic paycheck.
[Testimony by expert witness, Paul Shields]
Now, the way Staffing America does their business, what they
do is they receive from their customers or clients the amount of the the full amount of the gross payroll. And so that would include, you
know—well, they receive the full amount of the gross payroll plus a
commission for providing their service. So that gross amount comes
to them. And then what happens is they cut a check for the health
insurance coverage, they cut a check for state and federal
unemployment insurance and FICA and whatever other deductions,
you know, come out of the payroll. And so what they are left with,
then, after they pay all of those expenses is this commission amount.
Transcript, page 314-315, In 17-25, 1-2.
Thus Staffing was not deprived of any money or income when they
forwarded the health insurance payments on to AMC. Staffing received a gross
amount of income, paid the expenses from that gross amount and then kept the
balance for their o, >mmi Wu m .iiitl |»t \>l il Nulling was a con

"rustor,

trustee or beneficiary. When Staffing received the i i 101 icy ft oi i i. its client, Staffing
had a fiduciary duty to properly dispose of and allocate the money as directed. At
the moment that Staffing sent the money on to AMC, Staffing's interest and duty
with respect to the disposition of the funds ceased and its fiduciary duties were
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then fully satisfied.
At the point when the health insurance premiums paid by the employees
were received by AMC, Staffing was out of the loop of responsibility and duty,
and there was a fiduciary duty then established between AMC and the employee.
AMC had the duty to pay the health insurance premium to protect the client, and
indeed, a fiduciary relationship was then established between the employee and
AMC
When AMC failed to timely make health insurance premium payments and
employees were monetarily injured by the lack of current health insurance, AMC
actually reimbursed the employees for their out of pocket costs. AMC did not pay
Staffing for the medical expenses as it would have if there was a fiduciary
relationship between AMC and Staffing, but rather, because there was no fiduciary
relationship with Staffing, AMC directly paid the employees their incurred medical
expenses.
In certain cases, AMC did fulfill its fiduciary responsibility to the employees
by paying the medical expenses of the injured employees. Staffing also
participated in such payment of monies to the injured employees and therefore,
exercised one of the indicies indicating a fiduciary relationship between Staffing
and the injured employee. Staffing did not directly pay AMC the employee's out
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of pocket expenses anticipating that AMC \ vo\ ild fi ill ill 1:1 ic c h in ned fiduciary
relationship, but Staffing paid such expenses on its own, without tl ic involvement
of AMC, thus verifying and sustaining the fiduciary relationship it initially
established with the employee when it accepted the employee's gross wages.
c. Indicators of a Fiduciary Relationship:
The question then arises: what are the indicators of a fiduciary relationship?
Case law gives us some guidance:
Attorney fees may be recoverable in an action for breach of fiduciary
duty as a recognized exception to the American rule. In Heller v. First Nat'l
Bank, N.A., 657 P.2d 992 (Colo. App. 1982), the court of appeals found
that, because the standard of conduct required of a trustee is so high, the goal
in a breach of trust action is to make the injured party whole, and thus the
court has the discretion to award attorney fees if necessary to meet that goal.
This court later upheld Heller in Buder v. Sartore, 774 P.2d 1383 (Colo.
1989). Buder concerned a breach of fiduciary duty action. This court
reasoned that, as in a breach of trust action, the goal in a breach of fiduciary
duty action is to make the injured party whole. Hence, the injured party is
entitled to recover attorney fees if necessary to restore that party to his or her
pre-injury status. Buder, 774 P.2d at 1391. Bernhard v. Farmers Insurance
Exchange, 915 P.2d 1285 (Colo. 04/22/1996).
Bernhard involves an insurance claim, similar to that discussed in Campbell,
supra, with the Colorado court referrii ig tc tl le ii ISI it ai ice coo lpai ly's i elatioi iship
with the insured as a "quasi-fiduciary duty." While the Colorado court rejected
establishing a fiduciary duty by the insurance company with the insured (contrary
to the outcomein Campbell), the law set forth above does establish a few of the
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sought after indices to find that a fiduciary duty exists:
1. standard of conduct of the trustee is high
2. goal is to make the injured party whole
With the above indices in mind, we then turn to Campbell to flesh out
further indicators:
Under Utah law, plaintiffs may recover attorney fees if they are
successful in pursing a first-party bad faith suit against their insurer. Billings
v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah 1996). Such actions fall
within the rule that the damages available to plaintiffs "include both general
damages, i.e., those flowing naturally from the breach, and consequential
damages, i.e., those reasonably within the contemplation of, or reasonably
foreseeable by, the parties at the time the contract was made." Beck v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985). The rationale behind
allowing recovery of both general and consequential damages in first-party,
bad faith actions is "to remove any incentive for insurers to breach the duty
of good faith by expanding their exposure to damages caused by such a
breach beyond the predictable fixed dollar amount of coverage provided by
the policy." Billings, 918 P.2d at 466. Consequential damages in first-party
bad faith actions can be awarded for such things as attorney fees, loss of a
home or business, damages flowing from bankruptcy, and mental anguish,
provided such damages are foreseeable. Id. at 468; Beck, 701 P.2d at 802.
Campbell supra at 1145
Additional indices are thus identified:
3.

First party bad faith suit

4.

Damages flow naturally from breach

5.

Damages forseeable and within the contemplation of the

parties at the time of the contract
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Campbell explains its grant of attorney fees as a resi lit of a well recognized
exception to a rale against awarding attorney fees in tort cases:
We do, however, accept its assertion that breach of a fiduciary
obligation is a well-established exception to the American rule precluding
attorney fees in tort cases generally. We thus conclude that the trial court
correctly held attorney fees to be a proper element of damages in this case.
Id
The case at bar is not characterized as a tort action by either party; the
instant case does not involve insurers; and, by the delineation of the five factors for
the establishment of a fiduciary duty set forth above, this case does not involve the
breach of a fiduciary duty by AMC towards Staffing. With respect to the simple
payment of I; ^ i insurance premiums as the duty existed between Staffing and
AMC, the sti!!:<i

^

*ven if we del; i nine

that the standard of co

t

;

j

does not exist in the Staffing/AMC relationship because Staffing w:is ilot directly
injured by AMC's failure to make the health insurance premium payment.
Staffing may have been ultimately injured by AMC's actions, but the injury
is indirect, not easily quantifiable, uncertain of its parameters, extent and
dimensions. The persons actually injured, that is, the employees, were not parties
to the •?

Hr interests were not represented at the trial and there was

no assignmei it b> si icl :i pei sen is to tl ie plaii itil f regai din ig tl leii separate and distinct
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interests.
The above analysis also eliminates any claim which Staffing may have under
the last three prongs of the fiduciary relationship analysis: 1. AMC was not a first
party insurer; 2. No damages flowed naturally to Staffing from AMC's failure to
make payments, rather, the damages resulted in an alleged loss of confidence by
Staffing's clients in Staffing's ability to keep health insurance premiums current;
and 3. The damages were not clearly forseeable and were not contemplated by the
parties at the time of the formation of the contract. Staffing knew about the break
in periodic health insurance premium payments for nearly twelve months and if it
could have foreseen an alleged loss of income (a loss of income not illustrated by
Staffings' Exhibit 55 but alleged nevertheless) it would have immediately acted by
not forwarding withheld health insurance premiums on to AMC and would have
immediately stopped all payments to AMC and made such payments directly and
immediately to the health insurance providers on behalf of the potentially injured
employees.
So either the ultimate damages resulting from AMC's failure to make the
periodic health insurance payments were not forseeable, or Staffing itself was
simply negligent in continuing to send payments to AMC. We presume that
Staffing was net negligent, not wanting to unnecessarily impugn the integrity and
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good judgment of Staffing, therefore, we must conclude that the damages were not
foreseeable.
Under none of the above criteria is a fiduciary duty established between
AMC and Staffing.

The fiduciary relationship which did exist existed directly

between AMC and the employees without any intervening participation or
involvement by Staffing. As soon as Staffing received the health insurance
withholdings from the employees.
e m p l o y e e b \ M-.J : .
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?. -i •

insurance prei nium. I he fiduciary duty then transferred from employee and
Staffing to the employee and AMC, with AMC then bearing a duty of payment for
the benefit of the employee. At no point in the transaction does a fiduciary duty
arise between AMC and Staffing, for Staffing was but a conduit, receiving no
direct benefit from AMC's payment of the health insurance premiums and not
receiving any direct damage from the failure of AMC to fulfill its duty to v.«
employee.
rims, \\'i In no fiducia>

• -ty established, cai ried o\ it or broken between

AMC and Staffing, there can be no award for attorney fees arising from a breach of
a fiduciary responsibility and the award of attorney fees should be stricken.
d. There could exist no fiduciary duty under the circumstances of this case:
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In the case of First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., v. Banberry Crossing, 780
P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989), the Supreme Court stated that in the case of assessing a
Trustee's duty:*
"a trust itself creates a duty between the Trustee and a beneficiary. But the
Trustee's duty to the beneficiary does not imply that the Trustee may ignore
the trustor's rights and interest." Id. at 1256.
The Court went on to explain that in certain circumstances, "it is possible that the
Trustee is bound by a fiduciary duty to act in the interest of the trustor." Id. Said
circumstances are as follows:
1. where a trustor reposes its trust or confidence in the Trustee and
relies on the Trustee's guidance;
2. where the Trustee could exercise extraordinary influence over the
trustor; and
3. where the Trustee stands at a dominant position to the Trustor.
In the instant case, AMC was simply acting as a facilitator for that which
could have been done by Staffing America directly. And, in the instant case, no
fiduciary relationship existed. This is simply a breach of contract case.
e. There is no precedent for awarding attorney fees in the instant case:
While Staffing relies on Campbell, supra, to justify its position, it is critical
to note why insurance companies in third-party situations owe such a duty. The
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cases cited by Staffing in it trial briefs all concern third party claims brought under
limited circumstances.
In Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985) the
Supreme Court noted that a fiduciary relationship exists between insurers and the
insured in a third-party situation because the insured controls the disposition of
claims against its insured who relinquishes any right to negotiate on his own

trust ai id reliance placed in the iosi n ei b> 1:1 le ii isiii ed

The insured is wholly

dependent upon the insurers to see that, in dealing with claims by third parties, the
insured's best interests are protected. Id. at 799.
Again, as noted above, this was a contractual relationship or as Staffing's
counsel chose to portend, a negligent handling of procuring health insurance.
Whether attorney fees should be awarded in a particular case is a question of
law reviewed for correctness. Under Utah law, a party may recover attorney fees if
they are successful ii i pi u suit ig a f ii st part) ' bad fait! i si ill: agaii ist tl leii insurer. See,
General Billings v. Union Bankers Insurance Company, 918 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah
1996). The rationale allowing recovery of both general and consequential damages
in first-party, bad faith cases is
to remove any incentive for insurers to breach the duty of good faith
by expanding their exposure to damages caused by such a breach
beyond the predictable fixed dollar amount of coverage provided by
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the policy. Id. at 466.
The Utah Supreme Court has countanenced the award of attorney fees and
litigation costs in limited cases. As Staffing's attorney argued below, "the
Campbell court also held that '[although the foreseeability of damages test is
generally limited to the contractual realm, we note that it is used to determine
damages in the context of tortious, third-party bad faith claims justificed since
such claims 'arise only because of the contractual relationship of the parties.'"
(emphasis added)(quoting Savage v. Educators Insurance Company, 908 P.2d 862,
866 (Utah 1995). It is important to note that the above quotation refers to actions in
tort and a third party claim, whereas, the instant matter is not a bad faith third party
claim.
To permit an order of costs and fees in this case would give rise to a new
right for a successful plaintiff in a case not otherwise provided for by Utah case
law or statute. Furthermore, it is somewhat ironic, while testimony was given that
fees and litigation expenses would have been reasonably foreseeable to AMC,
unlike Campbell, there is no evidentiary showing that a small California based
business would anticipate that a contingency fee contract would be used or for
what amount it would be in Utah.
4. THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO JURISDICTIONAL
AUTHORITY TO COMPEL A THIRD PARTY, REDLAND INSURANCE
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COMPANY TO PLACE FUNDS IN ESCROW PURSUANT T() A
GARNISHMENT ACTION BY STAFFING
Prior to the trial in this case, AMC's insurer, Redlands Insurance Company,
which had previously issued a commercial insurance policy to AMC, filed a
declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the District of
Utah, case no. 2-04 -

. ;, h contends that AMC is not entitled to insurance

coverage mulei ll

i

, x v . Such case is currently pending in

federal court.
Subsequent to the entry of the amended judgment (28 May, 2004) and
AMC's filing of its notice of appeal on June 18, 2004, Staffing filed a Writ of
Garnishment on Redlands Insurance Company in an attempt to seize the full limits
of a commercial insurance policy issued by Redlands to AMC in spite of the
existence of the declaratory judgment action seeking to determine whether AMC
was entitled to insurance coverage.
Answers to Garnishee Interrogatories were filed In Redlands mi lulv l«).
2004, subsequent to AMC's docketing statement liliiii;

Redlands also filed ,i

Motion to Quash or Stay the Writ of Garnishment on July 22, 2004.
A hearing on all the issues was held on October 25, 2004 at which time the
trial court completely discounted any effect of the pending federal case and
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determined that "the Writ of Garnishment is a proper vehicle to levy upon the
Redland Policy as an asset of the Judgment debtor" (Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Order RE Writ of Garnishment to Redland Insurance Company, page
4, paragraph 1) and that the proceeds of the Redland Policy are not exempt (Id. at
page 5, paragraph 4). The trial court then ordered that the Redland policy limits of
$1,000,000 be placed into an escrow account which shall be released to Staffing:
If the Federal Court rules in favor of SAI, the balance of the account
including any interest shall be paid over to SAI or its attorneys as it
may designate. Id. at page 6, paragraph 4.
In explaining its decision to seize the insurance proceeds, the trial court
justifies its position by mention of the "authorities referenced by S AI including
American States Insurance Co. v. Walker, 26 Utah 2d 161, 486 P.2d 1042 (1971).
The only language in American States which is possibly pertinent to this matter is:
Dixie Ann Walker was involved in an automobile-motorcycle
collision, and was sued by Robert W. Clubb, the rider of the motorcycle. She
claims to be covered by a policy of insurance written by American States
Insurance Company wherein her father, Marvin J. Walker, is the named
insured
The insurance company denied coverage to Dixie Ann on the ground
that she was not an insured under her father's policy. She retained her own
attorney and settled the case on a stipulated judgment in favor of Mr. Clubb.
A garnishment was issued by Clubb, who traversed the answer of the
insurance company. Upon trial thereof, the lower court held the insurance
company to be indebted to Dixie Ann Walker and gave judgment against it
for the use and benefit of Mr. Clubb.
Subsequent to the service of the writ of garnishment, the insurance
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company filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to have a determination
of whether it is liable to Dixie Ann and Clubb under the policy. The trial
court held that Dixie Ann was an insured under the policy and awarded her
an attorney's fee for defending the declaratory judgment action.
The two cases were consolidated on this appeal.
There are two i i lattei s foi 01 11 detei 1 i linatioi 1:
1. Was Dixie Ann Walker a resident of her father's household at the time of
the collision? and
2. Is she entitled to an attorney's fee for defending the declaratory judgi :
action?
486 P.2d 1042, 26 Utah 2d 161 (1971)
AMC is unclear on how the above case applies in any respect to the instant
case. In American, supra, there was a dispute regarding insurance coverage, a
stipulated judgment was rendered between
garnished the insurance c< ••

'

1
T..-!-

• tcl the si lccessfi il Hi
:

. -id received a trial on the

issues. The issues did not concern the right of the successful litigant to garnish a
third party insurance company, but whether the insured lived in Utah and whether
she was entitled to attorney fees. There is no guidance whatsoever from the
American court to the instant trial court to guide the trial court's decision of
whether the third party garnishment is proper, considering the readily apparent fact
that there is a pending federal court declaratory judgment action, the outcome of
which will clearly affect the disposition ol \hv funds, regardless of (lie timing
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between the outcome of the federal court case (and any attendant appeals) and the
instant case.
In the event that in the federal case a motion for summary judgment is filed
by Staffing and granted in favor of Staffing, Staffing will then have the unfettered
right to seize all $1,000,000 of the funds. But in the very likely event that
Staffing's award in the instant case is reduced by $500,000 (the approximate sum
of the attorney fees and lost profits), then, because Staffing could have seized the
entire $1,000,000, AMC, or Redlands, will be forced to garnish and seize assets of
Staffing to receive back the money which the trial court now holds out for the party
with the quickest fruit picking arm. Furthermore, during the pendency of the
appeal, the instant case and the federal court action, such a ruling eliminates any
further liability coverage for any other claims or occurrences filed hereafter.
The findings of fact further state that case law cited Redland does not
preclude the isi uance of the Writ of Garnishment (Findings, page 4, para. 2) by
stating that Auerbach Co. v. Key Security Police, Inc, et. al. 680 P.2d 740 (Utah
1984) has materially different facts. AMC begs to differ. Key Security Police
transported the nightly deposits of Auerbachs (a Salt Lake City department store)
to the bank for deposit. The Key police were robbed one night and Auerbach sued
Key for the money. Key was defunct, but did have an insurance policy which
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Auerbach then issued a writ of garnishment against the insurer. Such facts are on
point with the instant case, but even more telling is the result:
Auerbach mistakenly relies on its judgment against Key Security as a
liquidated claim instead of on the claim between Key Security and
Guaranty National. It is undisputed that no proof of loss was ever
submitted, nor was any investigation or claim adjustment made to
Guaranty National with respect to the robbery. Auerbach attempts to
avoid the characterization of its claim against Guaranty National as
either tort or contract. As a garnishor, Auerbach may act only within
the framework of Key Security's cause of action; its rights if any,
against Guaranty National are derivative in nature. Auerbach may not
pursue Key Security's claim of wrongful denial of coverage through a
garnishment action, and we hold that Guaranty National's liability, if
any, is not subject to garnishment. Id. at 742
The above fact situation and the above ruling by the Utah Supreme court is
on point in the nstant case. AMC never made a claim against its insurer,
Redlands. No proof of loss was submitted. The rights of Staffing, if any, are
derivative in nature as the claims pertain to AMC's actions. However, those rights
of AMC are in question as evident by the declaratory judgment action in the
federal court. As Auerbach could not pursue Key Security's claim of wrongful
denial of coverage through a garnishment action, neither can Staffing pursue its
claim of coverage through a garnishment on the Redlands issued insurance policy,
the coverage of which is in serious and substantial dispute.
To give Staffing the right to seize disputed assets of AMC and Redlands
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without a trial and without following the established case law as set forth in
Auerbach is patent error by the trial court. AMC prays that this Court rescind the
October 28, 2004 order of the trial court placing the $1,000,000 in escrow and
order the imme iiate refund of such funds to Redlands.
CONCLUSION
The award for lost profits is speculative and without a solid evidentiary
basis in the law or in the facts. Staffing fails to carry its burden of proof for such
alleged lost profits and there is no degree or amount of certainty in the
establishment cf such lost profits. Thus, the award for lost profits should be
stricken.
Similarly, the award for attorney fees should be stricken from the
judgment. A substantial body of case law has been developed in Utah concerning
the standards o'~ proof which must be presented to the court regarding the
reasonableness of an attorney fee award. Staffing's claim that it is entitled to an
attorney fee is based upon bad faith insurance defense cases. There is no showing
of bad faith in this case nor is there established a fiduciary duty between the
litigants. A fiduciary duty was established between Staffing and the employees
and then between AMC and the employees, but never was a fiduciary duty
established between Staffing and AMC. Staffing was a mere conduit for the
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transfer of funds as was AMC. When AMC did not make certain insurance
payments, there; was no direct injury to Staffing, but rather the injuries were
suffered by the employees who did not have health insurance coverage when
needed.
Because there was no fiduciary relationship established between AMC and
Staffing, there can be no breach of a fiduciary responsibility. As there was no
breach of a fidi ciary responsibility with Staffing, attorney fees of over $270,000
cannot be imposed upon AMC. Thus, the award for attorneys' fees should be
deleted from the judgment along with the speculative claims for loss profits.
Finally, ,he trial court's order seizing the full amount of the $1,000,000
insurance policy issued by Redlands to AMC, which policy is the subject of a
declaratory jud *ment action in federal court, should be set aside on the grounds
that there is rig it or precedent for the seizure of the assets and the placement of
such assets in an escrow account subject only to the outcome of the federal case.
In the likely event that the instant court substantially reduces the amount of the
award granteu to Staffing, and in the possible event that the federal court
declaratory judgment action is unsuccessful by Redlands, AMC and Redlands will
be forced to pursue Staffing for reimbursement of the amount of the award reduced
below $1,000,(00.

Fairness and equity demand that the sums ordered into escrow
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be released to Redlands pending the final resolution of both the federal court
declaratory judgment action and the instant appeal.
Dated this _£/day of January, 2005.
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